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INCORRECT STATEMENTS OF FACT
Throughout the Respondent's Brief, Blair and Joann Grover (Grovers) repeat several
incorrect statements of fact. Rather than argue these assertions each time they are inserted, the
same are summarily discussed as follows:
1. Gaston was not Wadsworths' agent. Grovers make assertions such as "[t]hrough

Gaston, Earl told the Grovers what the balance of the note was." (Resp't Br. 6.) This
assertion was used to attempt to bridge the gap between Wadsworth and Grovers as to
supposed representations made by Earl Wadsworth (Earl) to Grovers. William Porter
Gaston (Gaston) was never the conduit of information or documents from Earl to
Grovers related to the balance owed. Information received from Wadsworths, such as
the 1996 statement of account may have been presented to Blair Grover (Blair) by
Gaston, 1 but considering the circumstances,2 nothing else was done. "The burden of
proving agency is upon the party who asserts it." Transamerica Leasing Corp. v.
Van's Realty Co., 91 Idaho 510, 517, 427 P.2d 284,291 (1967). The record is void of

any proof that Gaston made representations or had authority to make representations
on Earl's behalf to Grovers.

1

Gaston had in his possession the 1996 statement of account at the time of the
assignment/assumption. (Resp't Br. 11.) In his paperwork, Blair used the figure $56,000.00 as
the balance owed. This amount represents the 1996 year end declared balance.
2

See Appellant's Br. 4, 10-11.
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2. Grovers had the ability to determine the balance owed without reliance upon Earl's
calculations. Grovers argue that "[t]he Grovers did not know whether there had been
prepayments on the note, whether there had been any forgiveness of the note, or any
other alteration of the amount owed." (Resp't Br. 6.) 1bis argument is directly
opposite of the evidence and what Grovers constructively knew. 3 Gaston specifically
told Blair that prepayments were prohibited. 4 Gaston never made any prepayment,5
and Grovers never inquired about the same.6 Any lack of knowledge by Grovers was
self imposed. Grovers knew the payments were expected to continue at least through
September 2010. In his deposition, when asked ifhe understood the obligation was to
continue payments through 2010, Blair responded, "I don't have an independent
recollection of that, but I got to believe that I did. That's what it says." (Grover
Dep. 38:2-4.)

3. Norma has a sufficient foundation to testify as to amount owed. Grovers assert that
"Norma has no knowledge of the amounts owed on the note." (Resp't Br. 7-8.)
Although Norma did not keep any records and did not know how to amortize, she was

3

Equitable estoppel requires the party asserting estoppel to show that they could not have
discovered the truth. Sorensen v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 759, 118
P.3d 86, 91 (2005).
4

Blair Grover Dep. 33:8-9, 37:5-38:7, Sept. 14, 2007.

5

William Porter Gaston Dep. 81:10-21, Sept. 14, 2007.

6

Grover Dep. 48:23- 49:12.
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aware of the payment history. Norma testified that no prepayments were made. She
testified, and was competent to testify, that no payments were waived, nor were
modifications made to the contract. (R. Vol. 1, p.106, 'l['I[ 7-8.)

ARGUMENT
A. Account Stated.
The Grovers advocate that the 1996/1997 statement of account was received and relied
upon prior to the assignment/assumption, based upon Blair's speculative testimony, wherein he
testified he received the 1996/1997 statement of account from Gaston in March 1991. This
statement of account was actually given to Grovers in March 199£, in accordance with Earl's
standard practice of providing information to the purchaser to assist in preparation of income
taxes. 7 In their Brief, Grovers assert the parties knew the document [1996/1997 statement of
account] had been produced at the time of the sale because it was included in the packet of
documents used at closing. 8 As noted on the last line of that document, Earl wrote "PORTER
GASTON SOLD TO BLAIR GROVER, RIGBY MAY 1, 1997 BAL. DUE ON PRINCIPAL=
$54,984.23." (R. Vol. 1, p. 12) (emphasis added). "Sold" is a past tense verb, which shows the
document was made or completed after May I, I 997.
The term "amortization schedule" is loosely used. An amortization schedule is"[a]
schedule of periodic payments of interest and principal owed on a debt obligation; specif., a loan

7

Appellant's Br. 5, 10-11.

8

Resp't Br. 23 n.91.
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schedule showing both the amount of principal and interest that is due at regular intervals over
the loan term and the remaining unpaid balance after each scheduled payment is made." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 66

(7th abr. ed. 2000). As discussed at length in Appellant's Brief, the

handwritten statements are statements of account. An amortization schedule covers the future
payment breakdown, but a statement of account does not.

B. Mutual Examination of the Claims.
Over and over, Grovers allege that Earl was the exclusive "bookkeeper" and "note
holder." (Resp't Br. 11, 12, 14, 21, 22, 27.) Regardless of the number of times those allegations
are repeated, Earl had no duty, nor assumed function, to act as Gaston's, and then Grovers'
bookkeeper. The fact that Earl was a payee under the terms of the Promissory Note did not
impose any requirement for bookkeeping, nor did this fact provide additional, special, or
exclusive knowledge of facts necessary to calculate the outstanding balance at any given time.
Grovers also assert that they "could not have gone to a third party, i.e., a bank, and
figured out the balance of the Note .... " (Resp't Br. 12.) This assertion is absurd. Blair
possessed a copy of the Promissory Note. He knew, or could have known, all of the requisite
terms to determine the outstanding balance (original balance, interest rate, frequency of
payments, duration and a historical payment history). Blair admitted he had, in his own law
office, software to generate amortization schedules.
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Grovers assert that "[b]oth the original seller and the original buyer agreed to the Note's
balance." (Resp't Br. 12.) The cited authority for this assertion is Blair's own words and is
without proper foundation.
Grovers attempt to persuade the Court to infer that, because two partial year schedules
were prepared in 1997, there is proof the 1996/1997 statement was prepared in response to
Blair's inquiry in March 1997. Again, the most logical inference is that these statements were
prepared in March 1998, in conformity with Earl's practice of providing information to assist the
purchasers in preparation of income taxes. The reason for two separate statements was because
other were two different debtors in 1997. Gaston's four months of payments were simply added
to the 1996 statement.
Grovers also state "[t]he Wadsworths presented the district court with no evidence
suggesting that the 1996/1997 amortization schedule was not intended as a definite statement of
account to Gaston and the Grovers." (Resp't Br. I 4) (emphasis added). Wadsworths also

advocate the 1996/1997 schedule was a statement of account. As discussed previously, a
"statement of account" is not the equivalent of an "account stated." The 1996/1997 schedule was
not intended to be a final statement, as is required to be an account stated.
Grovers continue to attempt to transform the requirement of mutual examination into a
unilateral responsibility, by arguing that Earl did not catch his own error. For the reasons argued
elsewhere herein, this is error.
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.. -,

.

C. Mutual Assent.

Like the requirements of mutual examination, Grovers attempt to transform mutual assent
into unilateral assent. They argue that Wadsworths' silence, failure to object, etc., to their own
document(s) shows mutual assent. The cases cited by Grovers for this proposition (Needs v.

Hebener, 118 Idaho 438,443, 797 P.2d 146, 151 (Ct. App. 1990); Argonaut Ins. Cos. v. Tri-West
Constr. Co., 107 Idaho 643,646,691 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Ct. App. 1984)), all have the factual
pattern wherein a creditor sent a statement to a debtor who did not object or remain silent. This
is factually different from the present case. Grovers attempt to contort MT. Deaton & Co.
v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614,616, 759 P.2d 905,907 (Ct. App. 1988), in which an accounting firm
provided accounting services for an engineering company, and assert the present case is factually
similar because "Wadsworths functioned as the accountant for the Note." (Resp't Br. 16.) The
facts are not similar, nor are the inferences logical. As discussed above, Earl did not have the
duties of the accountant or bookkeeper.
An account stated is a manifestation of assent involving two parties, but does not alter the
original debt. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 282 clarifies the requirements of mutual assent
under an account stated, which does not operate in the manner held by the District Court. This
section reads:
(!) An account stated is a manifestation of assent by debtor and creditor to a
stated sum as an accurate computation of an amount due the creditor. A
party's retention without objection for an uureasonable long time of a
statement of account rendered by the other party is a manifestation of assent.
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(2) The account stated does not itself discharge any duty but is an admission by
each party of the facts asserted and a promise by the debtor to pay according to
its terms.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS§ 282 (emphasis added).
Comment c to § 282 states that the effect of an account stated operates as an admission
and a promise to pay. Accounts stated appear to be primarily evidentiary in nature. The District
Court discussed the "rebuttable presumption" as discussed in the Needs case. As Restatement of
Contracts shows, accounts stated are premised upon an existing creditor/debtor relationship,
which, as to Wadsworths and Grovers, did not take place until the time of closing. Grovers
assumed full responsibility to pay the Promissory Note in accordance with its terms. Now,
Grovers seek to avoid discharge of their remaining obligation under this Promissory Note. As
shown by Restatement (Second) Contracts §282(2), accounts stated are not intended to provide
such relief.

In discussing the Consent to Assignment and Assumption, and Release (Consent) signed
by Wadsworths, Grovers argue that the Consent incorporates the Assumption and Assignment
Agreement, and, for that reason, Wadsworths are bound by the terms of the Assumption and
Assignment Agreement. (Resp't Br. 16-18.) Grovers' argument culminates in Grovers'
statement that "[t]hus, the Wadsworths clearly assented to the Grovers' assumption of a Note
with a $54,984.23 balance." (Resp't Br. 19.) Grovers' claim that Wadsworths were
contractually bound is flawed. Particularly, as the drafter of the documents, Blair is not allowed
any leniency in the interpretation and construction of the documents. Blair divided both the
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Consent and the Assignment and Assumption Agreement into a recital section and an agreement
section. (R. Vol. I, pp.55-59.) In both documents, Blair used the words "WITNESSETH" and
"NOW THEREFORE." (R. Vol. 1, pp. 55, 58.) The term "witnesseth" is "usually set in all
capitals, commonly separates the preliminaries in a contract, up through the recitals, from the
contractual terms themselves, but modem drafters increasingly avoid it as an antiquarian relic."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (7th abr. ed. 2000). "Therefore" is defined as "[f]or that reason;
on that ground or those grounds" or "to that end." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th abr. ed.
2000). The reference to the Assumption and Assignment Agreement in the Consent is only
found in the recital section and is not part of any contractual obligation. Wadsworths are not
bound by the Assignment and Assumption Agreement. Conversely, Groves are bound by the
terms of the Promissory Note which they fully assumed.

D. Mistake is a Defense.
Grovers assert Earl made only a unilateral mistake and it is therefore not a defense to an
account stated claim. (Resp't Br. 20-21.) First, there are no mistakes in the Promissory Note or
other 1990 contractual documents, which clearly state the payment responsibilities. These
responsibilities were understood by Grovers. (Grover Dep. 36:25-37:9.) The mistake at issue is
with the interim computations of principal and interest. Grovers argue that only a mutual
mistake can be the basis of a defense against an account stated, but provide no authority to
support this argument. (Resp't Br. 21.) A mutual mistake is generally required to modify a
contract. "A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a
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misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon which the bargain is based."
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,482, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231 (2006). In an account stated, there

is no such requirement. In Rustlewood Assoc. v. Mason County, 969 P.2d 535 (1999), the
Washington Court of Appeals specifically held that a unilateral mistake of fact may overcome the
prima facie evidence established by an account stated.
In his Decision, Judge Tingey determined there was a unilateral mistake because Earl was

responsible for the mistake. (R. Vol. 3, p. 252.) A mistake is based upon a misconception, not on
who is responsible for creating the misconception.
Although Judge Tingey mentioned Wadsworths' argument regarding Grovers "conscious
ignorance," and even though it has strong applicability to this case, the District Court never
discussed conscious ignorance. Grovers cite Restatement (Second) Contracts § 153, which deals
with unilateral mistake. (Resp't Br. 22.) Judge Tingey referenced Restatements (Second)
Contracts §152, which deals with mutual mistakes. Both§§ 152 and 153 refer to Restatements
(Second) Contracts §154 as to who bears the risk of a mistake. Section 154 reads:
A party bears the risk of mistake when
(a)

the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or

(b)

he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats
his limited knowledge as sufficient, or

(c)

the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable
in the circumstances to do so.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §154 (emphasis added).
Comment c to§ 154 reads:
Conscious ignorance. Even though the mistaken party did not agree to bear
the risk, he may have been aware when he made the contract that his
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates was
limited. Ifhe was not only so aware that his knowledge was limited but
undertook to perform in the face of that awareness, he bears the risk of the
mistake. It is sometimes said in such a situation that, in a sense, there was
not a mistake but "conscious ignorance."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §154.
Grovers argue they had very limited knowledge, did nothing to investigate, and were
satisfied with the information they had. 9 In his deposition, Blair stated "I don't remember talking
directly to him [Gaston] at the time of this transaction. After I had this document that he
represented was Earl's statement of the balance that was owed, I was satisfied with that."
(Grover Dep. 34:19-22.) Blair was willing to accept the terms of payment, whatever they were.
Blair testified he did not perform a calculation of the monthly payments and the payment
obligations, which could have been through 2012. (Grover Dep. 41-42.)
Grovers assert that "[t]he Wadsworth have cited no authority that states that the contract
should be reformed under this circumstances." (Resp't Br. 22-23.) This statement implicitly
references the purported account stated, not the 1990 contract. Wadsworths do not seek to
reform the 1990 contract and related documents.
9

"Grovers had no knowledge whether there had been prepayments by Jensen, forgiveness,
off-sets, or other adjustments." (Resp't Br. 23.) Grovers could not have known of a different
outstanding balance. (Resp't Br. 22.)
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Grovers request this Court disregard Matthis v. Wendling, 962 P .2d 160 (Wyo. 1988)
because it is a Wyoming case and is supposedly factually different. Idaho's appellant courts have
not taken an elitist view of other states' cases in the past, nor would it be prudent to do so now.
Grovers' make a feeble attempt to distinguish this case on the basis that they were not a party to
the original transaction and did not have actual knowledge as to whether or not there had been
any prepayments, forgiveness, offsets, or other adjustments. (Resp't Br. 23.) These attempts to
distinguish the facts falls short. Factually, Grovers knew that no prepayments were made
because of Gastons' comments to him about the same being prohibited. The circumstances are
such that no one could logically infer there were offsets, forgiveness of the obligation, or other
obligations. 10 Grovers are not entitled to renegotiate the transaction with Wadsworths through
their exclusive dealings with Gaston. Rather, they step into Gaston's and Jensens' position.
Grovers reference the District Court's finding that "the fmal payment date is not a material
term of the Note ... [which] is only tangentially related to the ultimate obligation to pay a
specified amount." (Resp't Br. 24.) Wadsworths agree the final payment date is not material, but
timely payments are material. Grovers' argument is rooted in the District Court stating that "once
Grovers became aware of the balance owed and the applicable interest rate, the final payment date
was of minimal significance." (R. Vol. 3, pp. 252-53.) Such statements and arguments assume
the formation of a new contract, rather than the correct analysis of looking at the assumption of

10

These would be affirmative defenses and the party raising the defenses has the burden
of proof, pursuant to IRCP 8(c).
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the existing 1990 contract. "Awareness," orlack thereof, of a person assuming a contract does not
change or modify the terms of the contract. If that were the case, Grovers were aware of the
existing terms of the contract, which required the payments to be made as consideration for the
acquisition of the Northgate property. The District Court's ruling infers only the balance owed is
relevant at any given time. However, monthly payments by themselves are sufficient
consideration. Fix v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372,375,870 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ct. App.1993).
Grovers boldly, but falsely, state that "[nJo one disputes that Grovers are obligated to
$54,984.23 and did so." (Resp't Br. 24.) Wadsworths do dispute such assertion. Grovers assumed
liability without reservation for the payments required under the Promissory Note.

E. Promissory Estoppel.
Grovers make the absurd argument that Wadsworths are raising their "objection" to the
application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel for the first time on appeal, which they
advocate is not possible under an issue preclusion rule. (Resp't Br. 25). To the extent raised as a
claim by Grovers or as an issue by the District Court, Wadsworths have raised their objection and
defenses. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 11, 27.) 11
Grovers provides little defense to Judge Tingey's ruling related to promissory estoppel.
Grovers state "[t]hus, even if the court misapplied the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the
doctrine of estoppel certainly applies in this case." (Resp't Br. 25 n.96.) Shortly thereafter,
Grovers state that "[e]ven if the Court agrees with the Wadsworths that the district court
11

Action to Quiet Title ,i 9; Answer ,i 3 and affirmative defenses.
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improperly granted the Grovers' motion based on promissory estoppel, the Court may still affirm
the district court upon the correct theory." (Resp 't Br. 30) (emphasis added). Grovers fail to
discuss or rebut Wadsworths arguments that promissory estoppel is only a substitute for
consideration, not a basis for a substituted contract. (Appellant's Br. 21, et. seq.)

F. Specific Recommendations or Representations.
Grovers start out their discussion in this section with an incorrect statement that
Wadsworths represented a balance to Grovers prior to assuming the obligation, which constituted
a promise. (See discussion above.) Regardless of how many times Grovers repeat this statement,
it is still incorrect; there is no proof.
Grovers do not discuss the distinction between a "promise" and a "representation." As
defined by law, a promise lies in the intent of the parties to act or refrain from acting. In this
particular instance, the action, which needed to be performed or refrained from being performed,
was to receive fewer payments and consequently less money than what was promised, pursuant to
the 1990 contract. Although Earl believed the statement of account (his representation of fact)
was correct, there is a complete void of evidence to show he intended to accept less than the
required consideration.
Grovers make the self-serving argument that "[a]ny reasonable person would have taken
Earl's representation to be a final and accurate statement of the ultimate obligation under the
Note." (Resp't Br. 26.) Wadsworths submit that a "reasonable person," knowing he is assuming a
monthly payment obligation, would concern himself with knowing what his responsibilities would
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be (i.e., amount and number of monthly payments), rather than just knowing the outstanding
balance. This concern is heightened by the fact that Blair was an experienced attorney. Although
Blair avoided admitting it outright, he accepted the written document at face value and believed
his obligation was to continue to make the payments exactly as outlined in the Promissory Note.
As established, knowing the outstanding balance was only used to determine the amount of money
Grovers would pay to the original purchasers. In this case, Blair did not question the payment
obligation and did not see any inconsistency between the amount he used to calculate the buyout
to Gaston. Blair even stated his payment obligations may continue longer than what was stated in
the contract. 12

G. Wadsworths Could Not Foresee Grovers Reliance.
Grovers allege Wadsworths "blatantly misrepresented the record to the Court" in their
assertion that they did not know of Grovers' identity or contract negotiations. (Resp't Br. 26-27.)
These are strong words with no support. In support of their attack, Grovers present five
"reasons," discussed as follows:
12

Grover Dep. 42:1-7. Grovers challenge the use of depositions on appeal. (Resp't Br. 28
n.104.) The full depositions were presented to the Court as part of Defendant's Second Motion
for Reconsideration or Motion for Clarification. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 317A-317E.) Wadsworths'
Second Amended Notice of Appeal (R. Vol. 4, pp. 405-09) contains the appeal from the Court's
denial of this Motion. For simplicity of argument, granting of summary judgment and denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration as considered and presented collectively. Using the same
arguments, many parts of Grovers' arguments and cited support would be inconsistent. To
support the proposition that Blair had the 1996/1997 statement of account at the time of closing,
Grovers refer to the Clerk's Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, p. 223, (Resp't Br. 26. n 98) which is the
document itself. Only by referencing Gaston's deposition could any reference be made to having
the documents at closing (Gaston Dep. 92).
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1. "First, Gaston requested the 199611997 amortization schedule from the
Wadsworths for the express purpose of asserting the balance of the note at the time of the sale
from Gaston to the Grovers." (Resp't Br. 27.) For supporting authority, Grovers cite Blair's

deposition. Blair was without any knowledge as to whether or not Gaston ever contacted
Wadsworths prior to the time of closing when he requested the consent. Gaston and Wadsworths
both deny any contact with each other. (Gaston Dep. 46:19-23, 89:22-90:11; Norma Wadsworth
Dep. 37:9-21, Sept. 14, 2007.) Even if Blair made the request, the request does not show actual or
constructive knowledge on Wadsworths' part.
2. "Second, the 1996/1997 amortization schedule expressly refers to the sale of the
property to Blair Grover." (Resp't Br. 27) (emphasis added). This statement is correct on its

face, but does not support Grovers' attempted use. This statement supports the fact that the
notation was prepared after closing, not before. The past tense verb "sold" was used.
3. "Third, the 1996/1997 amortization schedule was included in the documents for the
sale. " Id (emphasis added). For support, Grovers refer to the 1996/1997 statement. There is

nothing on the face of the statement to indicate the document was included in the closing
documents. Certainly, Blair did not present any proof that the closing documents included the
1996/1997 statement.
4. Fourth, the Wadsworths signed a consent prior to the sale closing between the
Grovers and Gaston. " Id (emphasis added). This statement is technically correct. However, the

closing took place on April 30, 1997, the same day the Assumption and Assigument Agreement
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was signed. Wadsworths were not privy to either the signing of the Assumption and Assignment
Agreement or the closing. At this time, Wadsworths knew of Grovers' identity and assumption,
but it was substantively contemporaneous with the assignment and closing.
5. "The Grovers only agreed to assume the debt as represented by the Wadsworths in

the amount of$54,984.23. "Id (emphasis added). Such statement is contrary to the document
Grovers signed, which indicates they assumed the contract in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the 1990 contract. Grovers have substantial legal difficulties in this matter. First,
the Assignment and Assumption Agreement did not involve the Wadsworths. Second, pursuant
to the existing terms, Wadsworths consented only to the substitution of debtors and did not agree
to accept a lesser amount than what was owed. 1bird, in the Assumption and Assignment
Agreement, Blair stated he assumed and agreed to be bound by the Note and Deed of Trust, and to
pay the balance of the Note, in accordance with the terms thereof.

H. Grovers Reliance, If Any, Was Not Reasonable.
Grovers argue that Blair being an attorney is irrelevant. (Resp't Br. 28.) This assertion is
not true. "Evaluation of the reasonableness of a party's reliance must take account of the totality
of the circumstances, including the nature of the transaction and the relative sophistication of the
parties." Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 130, 135-136, 898 P.2d 61, 66-67
(Ct. App.1994). Throughout their Brief, Grovers assert they lacked knowledge of the true
outstanding balance. "Lack of knowledge can be shown by lack of understanding regarding the
contract terms arising from the use of inconspicuous print, ambiguous wording, or complex
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legalistic language, Id.; the lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about its terms,
Id.; or disparity in the sophistication, knowledge, or experience of the parties, Walker v. American
Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 948 P.2d 1123 (1997)." Lavey v. Regence BlueShield ofIdaho 139
Idaho 37, 42, 72 P.3d 877,882 (2003). Blair's legal background is relevant to his alleged
reliance.
Blair states his practice as an attorney "was to accept those representations" between the
parties involved in the transactions he is handling, and therefore shouldn't be responsible for the
terms of the Promissory Note because Gaston and Wadsworth had come to an agreement as to the
outstanding balance. This reasoning is flawed and would be a double standard. Blair refuses to
accept responsibility for documents he prepared and voluntarily signed, yet he advocates
Wadsworths be held responsible for documents they neither saw or signed.
Next, Grovers argue the fact that the statements of account are handwritten is irrelevant.
(Resp't Br. 28-29.) These statements are the basis for Grovers' claim of reliance. Blair was
familiar with amortization schedules, prepared them, and had them prepared. If, as he alleges, he
didn't trust the computer generated amortized schedules, a fortiori, he shouldn't trust the hand
written calculations of a stranger as represented by another stranger (assuming such representation
was made).
I. Doctrine of Estoppel.
Grovers refer to the "doctrine of estoppel" as "the correct theory" (Resp't Br. 30), but fail
to define the doctrine. Apparently, Grovers believe this doctrine is different from promissory
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estoppel. Black's Law Dictionary does not define "doctrine of estoppel." Idaho Courts have used
doctrine of estoppel to refer to insurance contract disputes, Shoup v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co., 142
Idaho 152, 154, 124 P.3d 1028, 1030 (2005); induced reliance, Gafford v. State, 127 Idaho 472,
477,903 P.2d 61, 66 (1995); equitable estoppel, City ofSandpointv. Sandpoint Indep. Highway

Dist., 126 Idaho 145,151,879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994); judicial estoppel, etc. Probably
intentionally, Grovers do not define or list the elements of doctrine of estoppel, nor do they cite
any case that would definitely refer to a particular type of estoppel. The only hint is found in
Grovers' statement that "[t]he doctrine of estoppel should prevent the Wadsworths from taking a
position opposite of their previous position that the $54,984.23 balance was correct." (Resp't
Br. 30.) Typically, this argument refers to equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel is not applicable
to the present case because: (1) Wadsworths did not intentionally misrepresent or conceal a
material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth, (2) Grovers had the ability to
know the truth, (3) any representation as to the amount owed was not made with the intent it be
relied on, and (4) as proved herein, Grovers did not rely upon the representation to determine what
they would pay Wadsworths in the future. Also, there would not be a "manifest injustice" in light
of Blair's indolence and state of mind, wherein he thought the outstanding balance was consistent
with the number of remaining payments. Christensen v. City ofPocatello, I 42 Idaho 132, 124
P.3d 1008 (2005).
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

A. Commercial Transaction.
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Grovers assert Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007)
supports their position, that a commercial transaction took place in the present case. The present
case is very dissimilar. In Blimka, the number of jeans caused the matter to be deemed a
commercial transaction because the amount proved the jeans could only be inventory and not for
personal use. Although land could also be classified as inventory, this is not the case herein.
The nature of this case was to quiet title, which Wadsworths discussed, in the Appellant's
Brief, with supportive authorities showing this case to be a commercial transaction. Grovers did
not refute or discuss these cases in their Brief. (See Appellant's Br. 24, et. seq).

B. Blair Grover's Status as Member of the Law Firm Prohibits Attorney Fees.
Ironically, a few sentences after arguing the commercial nature of the transaction, Grovers
argue that "[t)he subject matter is exclusively personal to the Grovers in their individual capacity.
. . ." (Resp't Br. 34.) Grovers assert they regularly paid Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney, P.A., which
demonstrates the precise relationship. No citation is given, nor can Wadsworths find any
reference in the record, that would show actual payments were made or that funds were not paid
back to Grovers were not given any profits, dividends, or other compensation from the firm. In

Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1989), the reasoning
was based upon sound policy to have a detached and objective perspective. The small differences
in fact, as advocated by Grovers, do not change this overall policy. The policy the Court should
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follow is that if, and only if, a law firm or attorney obtains representation from a disinterested law
firm or attorney, should attorney fees be considered.

C. Attorney Fees Against Norma Wadsworth.
Grovers appear to infer that Norma instigated this action. Grovers brought Norma into
this case, both individually and as the Personal Representative of Earl Wadsworth's Estate, by
their Action to Quiet Title. Norma was a signatory to the various contract documents and a
beneficiary under the Deed of Trust, as well as a payee under the Note. However, these were not
the basis upon which Judge Tingey ruled. Judge Tingey ruled on the quiet title action and Earl's
actions, not the 1990 contract.

D. Denial of Summary Judgment to Wadsworths.
The Idaho appellate courts have held that an order denying summary judgment is not
reviewable on appeal by itself. The rationale is stated in Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164
P.3d 819 (2007), as follows:
By entering an order denying summary judgment, the trial court merely
indicates the matter should proceed to trial on its merits. The final
judgment in a case can be tested upon the record made at trial, not on the
record made at the time summary judgment was denied. Any legal rulings
made by the trial court affecting the final judgment can be reviewed at that
time in light of the full record. This will prevent a litigant who loses a case
after a full and fair trial from having an appellant court go back to the time
when the litigant had moved for summary judgment to review the relative
strengths of the witnesses of the litigants at that earlier stage. Were we to
hold otherwise, one who has sustained his position after a fair hearing of
the whole case may nevertheless lose because he has failed to prove his
case fully on the interlocutory motion.

Garcia v. Windley, 164 P.2d at 822 (emphasis omitted).
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The denial of summary judgment herein is neither an isolated interlocutory order nor an
appeal taken after trial. Under the present circumstances on appeal, the denial of a summary
judgment should be on equal footing with granting summary judgment. In the alternative, the
Court has the authority to make specific directions to the District Court on remand. Recently, in

Steedv. Grant Teton Counsel of the Boy Scouts ofAm., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007), the
Idaho Supreme Court so held. In Kenneth F. White Chtd v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'l Med. Ctr., 136
Idaho 238, 31 P.3d 926 (2001), the Idaho Court of Appeals specifically reversed granting
summary judgment and remanded the case back to the district court for entry of judgment in favor
of St. Alphonsus, the party whose motion of summary judgment was denied. See also Roles v.

Townsend, 138 Idaho 412, 64 P.3d 338 (Ct. App. 2003); Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 133
P.3d 1232 (2006).
CONCLUSION

A basic tenet of contract law is to determine and enforce the mutual intent of the parties,
which is also referred to as mutual assent or the meeting of the minds. In the present case, all
parties believed and intended the monthly payments would continue as outlined in the Promissory
Note. Grovers accepted the Promissory Note and other contract documents at face value, and
even stated the payments may continue beyond the scheduled pay-off date. Unfortunately, when
Grovers were informed they unknowingly paid Gaston and Jensen $13,000.00 more than they
were obligated to pay them for their equity in the Northgate property, Grovers, even though
Gaston was willing to pay Grovers one-half of the overpayment, refused to accept the money.
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Instead Grovers seek to avoid paying Wadsworths future payments of more than $40,000.00,
pursuant to a written and unambiguous Promissory Note. Wadsworths were not privy to either the
negotiations or the terms of assumption arrived at by Grovers and Gaston. Any information
provided by Earl was conveyed in good faith, but nevertheless inaccurate.
The District Court erred as discussed. This case should be reversed as to summary
judgment for Grovers and remanded to the District Court for entry of judgment in favor of
Wadsworths.
DATED: April ;J_f2, 2008.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and accurate copies of the foregoing was served by
placing the copies in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid on April-:, -0, 2008, addressed to the
following:
Michael D. Gaffney
John M. Avondet
Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney, et al
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

~-,/~-David A.
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